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this institution from the same position in society. The book's failure
to recognize and explore this difference is a weakness that preserves
the marginalization of non-lesbian women and lesbians in legal
discourse.
Similarly, the authors fail to explore the intersection of race,
gender, and sexual orientation. There is no acknowledgement in
the book of the diversity of experiences of lesbians and gay men.
In short, while I have some criticisms of this work, the authors
are to be commended for choosing to focus on the issue of sexual
orientation and the law for serious analysis. However, their failure
to question heterosexist assumptions about culture and society perpetuates the essential invisibility of lesbians and gay men.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY. By Michael J. Glennon.' Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
1990. Pp. 353. Cloth, $35.00.
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By Louis Henkin.2 New York and Oxford: Columbia University Press. 1990. Pp. 125. Cloth,
$24.50.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR. By
Harold Hongju Koh.3 New Haven: Yale University Press.
1990. Pp. 340. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $14.95.
Robert G. Kaufman 4
These books address a subject fraught with a long history of
controversy, the constitutional dimension of American foreign policy. Since 1793, when President Washington risked war by declaring neutrality in violation of a treaty with France, presidents and
the Congress have continued to debate their respective legal powers
in the realm of foreign affairs. 5 The executive branch has consistI. Professor of Law, University of California Davis, School of Law.
2. University Professor Emeritus and Special Service Professor, Columbia University.
3. Professor of Law, Yale University.
4. Bradley Resident Fellow, the Heritage Foundation.
5. For an excellent discussion of the origins of this controversy, see R. TUCKER & D.
HENDRICKSON, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: THE STATECRAFT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 48·63
(1990).
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ently claimed that the Commander and Chief Clause and rights inherent in sovereignty give presidents authority to use force, to take
actions which risk war, and to make international agreements, even
without congressional consent. The legislative branch has claimed
that article I grants the Congress primacy in the making of war and
foreign policy, so that unilateral executive action in these areas violates the constitutional mandate of shared powers.
Scholarly opinion on this subject has moved in cycles, reflecting shifts in the prevalent world-view of American liberals. From
the New Deal until the Vietnam War, the regnant theory was that
broad executive power in the areas of foreign policy and national
security is constitutionally sound and politically wise. Then dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War led to a new orthodoxy: Congress
and the courts must restore the proper constitutional balance by reconstraining Presidents from exercising "untrammelled national security power." This movement reached its apotheosis with the War
Powers Act of 1973 ("the Act"). Passed over President Nixon's
veto, considered unconstitutional by every president since, the Act
limits the duration of involvement of any U.S. armed forces in hostilities or in situations where hostilities are clearly imminent, unless
Congress allows it, or U.S. forces or territory come under attack.
The analyses of Professors Michael Glennon, Louis Henkin,
and Harold Hongju Koh all exemplify the new orthodoxy. Each
considers excessive executive power to be the fundamental constitutional and practical problem for American foreign policy today.
Each castigates Congress and the courts for ceding to presidents too
much constitutional authority. Although these books preceded
President Bush's deployment of troops and warships in the Persian
Gulf, each bears directly on that crisis, and the constitutional
problems arising from it. Alas, the authors' analyses are less persuasive than their subject was timely. Koh and Glennon base their
argument on flawed reasoning, dubious and selective constitutional
history, and even more dubious policy judgments. Henkin adopts a
more nuanced approach and reaches more balanced conclusions.
Ultimately, however, his argument also fails because his policy prescriptions do not follow from his questionable premises.
Glennon and Koh emphasize that the Constitution grants the
president only paltry war-making authority, compared with the extensive powers article I grants the Congress. Relying on the Advise
and Consent Clause, both also argue that presidents' extensive reliance on executive agreements has usurped Congress's constitutional
role in the process of formulating U.S. foreign policy. Glennon and
Koh also base their argument on their reading of the Federalist Pa-
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pers and court decisions. From the obviously valid premise that the
framers intended to limit the exercise of arbitrary national security
authority, both authors reach the questionable conclusion that presidents lack the constitutional authority to risk war, undertake covert action, or interpret treaties, without express congressional
consent. Both recognize, grudgingly, the constitutional problems
that Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha poses for
the legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution, an act which they
lament has not done enough to curb the executive. To strengthen
the act, both recommend amendments to make it even more difficult for presidents to dispatch forces abroad without congressional
consent. Both thus endorse a variant of S.2, a proposal which Senators Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell introduced in 1989. This
bill would replace the War Powers Act's unconstitutional automatic
requirement for withdrawal of troops after sixty days with an expedited process for a joint resolution authorizing the action or requiring disengagement. Further, it would require the president to
consult regularly with a standing congressional core group. In addition, both authors urge Congress to strengthen statutory controls
requiring consultation about and centralized congressional oversight over covert operations and treaty making. As both Glennon
and Koh recognize, their preferred outcome requires that courts enforce executive compliance, which Congress can accomplish by statutory directive or the Supreme Court can facilitate by abandoning
its "excessive" reliance on the political question doctrine in cases
involving foreign policy.
Glennon and Koh seem to consider unconstitutional virtually
every presidential use of armed force without explicit congressional
consent. Henkin is more moderate: he defends the constitutionality
of the Vietnam War, stressing that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
authorized it. Nor does he believe that the framers' intentions and
the text of the Constitution resolve these questions as clearly as
Glennon and Koh suggest. He argues that not just the presidents,
but the judiciary and the Congress have aggrandized their constitutional powers and developed large extraconstitutional powers. Still,
his interpretation of the framers' intent and his policy judgments
closely correspond with theirs. He bases his argument for greater
congressional and judicial assertiveness in foreign affairs on two
competing principles: greater democratization; and the need, implicit in constitutionalism, to limit arbitrary power.
None of these authors makes a cogent case. What they demolish is a caricature, a theory of absolute executive prerogative which
no executive has ever claimed. There are two related but separate
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issues involved in separation of powers questions, which the authors
sometimes treat as synonymous. One, what is the proper allocation
of authority? Two, when should courts enforce that allocation?
On the first question, there are powerful justifications for
granting the president much greater national security power than
the authors recognize. Begin with the constitutional text. Article II
defines the office of the presidency only vaguely; article I defines the
responsibilities of Congress more extensively. These provisions
leave many issues unresolved. What is executive action? What is
the scope of the advise and consent power? Do all resorts to force
require a declaration of war, or prior congressional consent? What,
if any, is the distinction between the authority to declare war, and
the broader authority to make war, which the framers decided after
debate not to grant the Congress? Reasonable people can disagree,
then, about the textual allocation of national security authority. Or
as Edward Corwin aptly put it: the Constitution is an invitation to
struggle for the privilege of directing our foreign policy.6
What does the concept of separation of powers tell us about the
problem? This inquiry requires reasoning, not from the individual
meanings of the words in the text, but from the structure of government established by the text. 1 Glennon, Koh, and Henkin interpret
article II's reticence about executive power restrictively, but an expansive interpretation is even more plausible. One can construe the
"herein granted" language of article I as limiting congressional authority. Conversely, the absence of this language in article II suggests that the executive has the responsibility for foreign policy
arising from the prerogative of sovereignty, subject only to article
l's specific, not implied, limits. s After the dismal failure of the Articles of Confederation, the framers recognized that an effective foreign policy required a strong executive, capable of decision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch. They considered Congress ill-suited for these
tasks. This is why the Constitutional Convention rejected the idea
of giving Congress the authority to make war in favor of the more
limited grant of authority to declare war.9
Precedent also supports the idea that the executive branch possesses a unilateral prerogative to respond to aggression with force.
Since 1789, the President has sent troops or arms abroad more than
E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 201 (5th ed. 1964).
See THE FETIERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH (L. Crovitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989).
8. See L. Crovitz, Micromanaging Foreign Policy, 102 THE PUBLIC INTEREST No. 100
(Summer, 1990).
9. See Sofaer, Separation of Powers and the Use of Force, in CRovrrz & RABKIN, supra

6.
7.

at 16.
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200 times, while Congress has declared war on only five occasions.
To be sure, in some of these cases Congress may be said to have
authorized the president's action, but presidents acted without specific congressional authorization in two-thirds of the uses of force
abroad without a declaration of war.IO
As even the most ardent proponents of executive power concede, the president should not have absolute authority in foreign
affairs or national security policy. Nevertheless, Glennon, Henkin,
and Koh slight the effective constitutional and political mechanisms
which Congress has always had at its disposal in these areas. There
is the power over the purse, which no president, including Nixon,
has challenged. However ambiguous their contours, the Declaration of War and Advise and Consent Clauses circumscribe the frequency and extent of arbitrary executive action. There are also
political restraints: If the Vietnam War proved anything, it is that
presidents cannot ignore Congress and public opinion, without
courting political disaster. Why are further restraints on executive
power necessary?
One answer for the authors, is that lately our presidents have
been doing things of which the authors disapprove. Worse, Congress and the public have generally supported presidents' using
force abroad, if not affirmatively then at least by acquiescence. This
being so, judicial intervention seems necessary to save us from presidents like Reagan.11 But if the president's powers depend on
whether one approves of his use of those powers, what is the point
of constitutional theory?
As an example of this result-oriented jurisprudence, consider
Professor Glennon's analysis of the president's authority to enforce
treaties. He argues astonishingly that the NATO Treaty actually
amounted to a bluff, because the president could not enforce the
American obligation without a formal congressional decision to declare war.
This argument flies in the face of long-established law and precedent. Treaties are the supreme law of the land. By consenting to
the NATO Treaty, the Senate clearly authorized the president to
fulfill our responsibilities thereunder, until the Senate acted to ratify
or reject his decision. The framers explicitly recognized the executive's authority to respond to sudden attack without prior congresIbid.
II. A revisionist interpretation of U.S. foreign policy underlies the analysis and policy
prescriptions of all three authors. Their polemical treatment of Ronald Reagan and neuralgic
criticism of his decisions to use force in the Persian Gulf, Libya, and Grenada highlight this
in bold relief.
10.
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sional approval. This principle surely extends to enforcing treaty
obligations to which the Senate has given its formal advice and consent. In the case of NATO, all American presidents have thought
so. So, generally, had the American people, our allies, our potential
adversaries, and the Congress. When occasionally legislators have
sought to limit the president's discretion, presidents have prevailed,
as Senator Taft found out when he objected to President Truman's
decision to deploy four divisions in Europe unilaterally after North
Korea attacked the South in 1950. True, President Washington
warned against entangling alliances, but as a matter of policy, not
constitutional doctrine. The framers intended to make alliances difficult, but not to rule out altogether a security option which they
recognized as vital in certain circumstances.
Contradictions also abound in Glennon's analysis of the treaty
power. On the one hand, he defends the constitutionality of President Carter's abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with
the Chiang government. On the other hand, he rebukes President
Reagan for rejecting the Senate's interpretation of the ABM Treaty,
even though the Soviet Union, the other Treaty party, also did not
subscribe or adhere to the Senate's interpretation. Glennon's positions are hard to reconcile: The act of interpreting a treaty is a
much more modest claim of executive power than the act of abrogating one. Again, Glennon's policy preferences seem to resolve
this apparent paradox. He favored the recognition of Red China.
He opposes SDI.
Glennon and Koh also shift the premises of their legal theories
to achieve their preferred results. Arguing for an executive with
limited powers in foreign affairs, both invoke original intent and
construe the text of the Constitution restrictively. Arguing for
broad congressional powers to make foreign policy, both happily
discard the principles of original intent and strict construction by
inferring powers which the Constitution does not explicitly confer.
Their interpretation of the leading Supreme Court decisions
and their argument for a more assertive judiciary betray similar inconsistencies and logical flaws. The courts have long deferred to
presidents exercising wide unilateral powers in the areas of national
security and foreign affairs. In United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. , the Court recognized the plenary and exclusive powers
of the president as the sole organ of the federal government in foreign affairs. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, also distinguished separation of powers controversies involving foreign policy
from those involving domestic affairs: "Assuming that the challenged delegation, if it were confined to internal affairs, would be
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invalid, may it nevertheless be sustained on the grounds that its exclusive aim is to afford a remedy for a hurtful condition within a
foreign territory?" The Court said yes. According to Sutherland,
the president may exercise foreign policy powers not explicitly
granted to him in the Constitution as a necessary prerogative of
sovereignty. Sutherland did not claim, as Koh and Glennon imply,
that the president has unlimited authority. Rather, Sutherland
stressed "the very delicate, plenary, and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations-a power which does not require as a basis
for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution."
Glennon, Koh, and Henkin consider Curtiss- Wright's reasoning spurious and anomalous. As they see it, courts ought to apply
rigorously Justice Jackson's tripartite formula, which he set forth in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for resolving separation of
powers disputes: 1. When a president acts pursuant to express or
limited authorization of Congress, his authority is at a minimum.
2. When the president acts in the absence of either a constitutional
grant or a denial of authority, he can rely on his own independent
powers, but there is a twilight in which he and the Congress may
have concurrent authority. 3. When the president takes measures
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for there he can rely on his own constitutional power minus any constitutional power of Congress over the
matter.
The Court's reasoning in Youngstown does not support the authors' assertion that presidents have routinely exceeded their constitutional authority in the area of foreign affairs. In Youngstown, six
Justices (three concurrers and three dissenters) sustained CurtisWright's vision of the president's authority in foreign affairs. Justice Jackson envisaged Youngstown as a domestic separation of powers controversy: "I shall indulge in the widest latitude of
interpretation to sustain ... [the president's] exclusive executive
function to command the instruments of national force, at least
when turned against the outside world for the security of our society. But when it is turned inward, not because of rebellion, but
because of lawful economic struggle between industry and labor, it
shall go no farther." Similarly, the logic of Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence supports the executive branch's prerogative to use
armed force unilaterally in a wide array of circumstances: he argued that a systematic, unbroken executive practice long before
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pursued with the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by presidents who have sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of government, must be treated as a gloss of the Executive
Power vested in the president by article II. Justice Clark also defined the power of the Executive broadly, while the dissenters-Justices Minton, Reed, and Vinson-would have sustained Truman's
seizure of the steel mill.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have repudiated the authors' broad reading of Youngstown. Generally, the courts have
simply refused to hear separation of powers cases involving foreign
affairs, invoking the political question doctrine.12 When judges
have decided such cases on the merits, resounding majorities have
generally upheld executives' claims of broad national security powers.13 Glennon and Koh argue that the political question doctrine
should not be so broadly interpreted, but their analysis is sharply at
odds with the selective original intent analysis by which they judge
the executive branch. Witness, for example, their coolness to the
Court's reasoning in Chadha, even though the majority relied on
strict construction of the Constitution to strike down legislative vetoes such as those contained in the War Powers Resolution.
Professor Henkin's analysis avoids this blatant double-standard, but suffers from an equally severe shortcoming: once he discards original intent as a standard of analysis, he lacks a compelling
criterion for evaluating separation of powers controversies. His
formula of democracy, accountability, and protection against arbitrary authority is hopelessly vague and subjective. Nor, even if one
accepts this formula, do his prescriptions follow from his premises.
According to Henkin, the need for greater accountability in and democratization of the making of foreign policy require greater congressional involvement. Actually, the opposite is true. In foreign
affairs, where prompt and decisive action are often essential, the executive has a greater claim to primacy than in any other field. The
executive branch has the capacity, vital in foreign affairs, to initiate
action: Congress generally performs best in its oversight function,
as a reactive institution. While congressional authority is diffuse
and its procedures ponderous, presidential authority is unitary, hierarchical, and centralized. Legislators have unique and limited
constituencies; the president, in contrast, represents the nation.
Where numbers and procedures blur accountability for 535 legisla12.
13.

See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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tors making foreign policy, the public can draw a clear link between
executive action and responsibility.
Obsessed by executive power and writing from a narrow legal
perspective, the authors seem oblivious to the dangers of an Imperial Congress or a paralyzed government. Yet these dangers are
real. A combination of developments over the past two decadesnotably the weakening of political parties and the Watergate reforms-has shifted the institutional balance of power away from the
executive and congressional leadership to the individual legislators
themselves. There are now more than 25 subcommittees in both
houses dealing with foreign policy, with which the president must
negotiate. This is the Congress to which our authors would like to
assign even greater power!
Congress, of course, has a vital role to play in making foreign
policy. The framers wisely did not consider efficiency an absolute
value. Constitutionalism presupposes some inefficiencies as the
price of limited government, protection of individual liberties, and
popular sovereignty. In the long run, moreover, these apparent inefficiencies may better reflect and achieve a nation's interest than
the superficial efficiency of closed societies. Congress performs an
essential constitutional function in its capacity for oversight, for dissent and debate, and for reflecting various strata of public opinion.
Institutionally, it serves as a salutary check on the excesses of the
executive branch.
The problem is to strike a reasonable balance. Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that the Constitution permits, even if it does not
mandate, the types of restrictions on presidential authority that the
authors want. We should still reject them. Historically, an effective
American foreign policy has depended on a president able to lead.
The Cold War consensus and the Imperial Presidency, which the
authors malign, succeeded in taming the nation's most dangerous
and relentless adversary at less cost and risk than even the most
optimistic observers had a right to hope. Similarly the most effective periods of American foreign policy before the Second World
War coincided with and probably depended on strong executive
leadership in foreign affairs. In the post-Cold War era, the prospects for creating and sustaining a stable and prosperous world order will continue to depend on an executive branch that is able to
act vigorously in foreign affairs, as recent events in the Middle East
eloquently attest.
Of course presidents have blundered and lied from time to
time. The same can be said of any institution with power. What we
need is a judicious appraisal of the relative performance of the two
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branches, in the long perspective of history. Our authors fail to provide this. They ignore the story of how congressional isolationism
nearly crippled President Roosevelt's correct and critical effort to
resist Hitler. Nor, to cite another obvious example, do they mention the malignant effects of Senator McCarthy on the conduct of
American foreign affairs. Lacking the historical long view, they remain traumatized by the anti-war version of the Vietnam experience, which the boatpeople, glasnost, and the demand for freedom
in Eastern Europe should have utterly discredited. Their legalistic
prescriptions would divert the proper focus of the enduring and
necessary foreign policy debate away from the realm of politics,
where it belongs, to the courts of law, where it does not.

POWER AND PREJUDICE: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. By Paul
Gordon Lauren.I Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1988.
Pp. xv, 388. Cloth $50.50; paper, $19.95.

Mary L. Dudziak2
Professor Paul Gordon Lauren takes on an ambitious task: an
examination of the importance of race and racism in international
politics and diplomacy, particularly in the twentieth century. The
result is a well written and carefully researched study of the impact
of racial ideologies and racist practices on world events.
Although at times he paints with a rather broad brush, discussing major political and ideological developments with great brevity,
the strength of Professor Lauren's book is that it brings so many
different pieces together. We can view Plessy v. Ferguson, for example, not only in the context of American racism in the 1890s, from
lynching to the massacre at Wounded Knee, but also in the context
of European racial theories, and of efforts to promote white
supremacy in Australia and Canada through restrictive immigration laws. By adopting this comparative perspective, Lauren is able
to isolate factors that he believes influenced policies on race.
The book begins with an historical overview of white racism,
from the assumptions of racial inequality held by Aristotle and
Saint Augustine to the "scientific" racism of the nineteenth century.
Ideas about racial differences had profound consequences when
I. Professor and Director of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center, University of
Montana.
2. Professor of Law, University of Iowa.

